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Promoting SME cooperative aggregations: main criteria and 
contractual models 
Collaboration is considered an effective solution to improve business strategies. 
However, SMEs often lack common principles and common forms of contractual 
coordination. Several policies implemented by E.U. have addressed the setup of a 
comprehensive SME policy framework, but European institutions seem to have 
focused more on organizational devices to conduct business activities rather than 
on contractual forms of coordination. In April 2009, Italy adopted a law in 
network contract to promote the development of inter-firm cooperation strategies 
to foster enterprises’ innovation and growth. Even if this law represents a novelty 
in Europe and may offer new challenges and hints, it still presents some lacks in 
its formulation. The current research aims at presenting the Italian law for 
network contract and an comparison with other model of SME aggregations 
adopted in EU countries. A formal model to support the design of a SME 
network was proposed, by providing both an ontology-based model to help the 
definition of the contract in a structured way, and a basic workflow to identify the 
important phases of the network design, i.e., the feasibility study and the 
negotiation.  
Keywords: SME aggregation, network contract, ontology, UML 
1. Introduction  
A lot of literature is available on the analysis of industrial networks (Antonelli et al. 
2007, Bennett et al. 2009, Michaelidesa et al. 2012, Renna 2012 ).  Individually, SMEs 
are often unable to capture market opportunities which require large production 
quantities and homogenous standards, and they experience difficulties in achieving 
economies of scale in the purchase of inputs, such as equipment, raw materials, finance, 
consulting services, etc. (Ceglie and Dini 1999). Through networking, individual SMEs 
can address the problems related to their size and improve their competitive position. 
Through horizontal cooperation (i.e. with other SMEs occupying the same position in 
the value chain), enterprises can collectively achieve scale economies and pool together 
their production capacities to satisfy large-scale orders. Through vertical cooperation 
(with other SMEs as well as with large-scale enterprises along the value chain), 
enterprises can specialize on their core business and give way to an external division of 
labour.   
Collaboration represents an increasing tendency among small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs) and is considered an effective solution allowing the achievement of 
development strategies, either to improve production processes or to increase 
competitiveness based on innovation and quality (Villa 2002, Ferrari 2010). SMEs are 
the engine of the European economy, being the 99% of all European businesses, and 
have been the target of several policies implemented by E.U. institutions (Matt and 
Ohlhausen 2011). For example the “Small Business Act” adopted in June 2008, for the 
first time puts into place a comprehensive SME policy framework for the E.U. Member 
States (Borbas 2009). However, European institutions seem to have focused more on 
organizational devices to conduct business activities rather than on contractual forms of 
coordination. The absence of common contractual coordination forms and of common 
principles of European contract law could negatively affect the functioning of markets 
and hamper SMEs’ growth (Ferrari 2010). 
In Italy, a recent law defined the “business network contracts” to point out the 
strategic goals and mutual activities of SMEs that want to build a network. Network 
contracts can help SMEs overcome limitations due to their dimension without causing 
them to lose their legal independence, while also enabling them to collaborate with 
firms of different dimensions. Furthermore, the network contract overcome the 
limitation of clusters and districts to be composed only by enterprises sited in a specific 
geographical area. 
Even if the Italian law represents a novelty in Europe and may offer new 
challenges and hints for future discussion at international level, it still presents some 
lacks in its formulation (Granieri 2009, Scognamiglio 2009). A fundamental problem is 
the lack of a formal representation of the ontology of the network contract, being only a 
descriptive summary of a mode of organization of the market that can be achieved 
through different negotiation. Another problem is that nothing is said with regard to 
property rights (e.g., the know-how gained during the technological innovation) and the 
distribution of profits. To address these problems we define a formal model to support 
the design of a SME network, by providing both a formal ontology-based model to help 
the definition of the contract in a structured way, and a basic workflow which identifies 
the important phases of the network design. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the Italian 
business network contract, by presenting its weeks and potentialities, and proposes an 
ontology-based model to represent it in a more structured way. Section 3 focuses on the 
network contract design phases to correctly set up a SME network. Particularly, the 
phases of Feasibility study and Negotiation are addressed. In Section 4 a comparison 
between the Italian business network contract and other forms of SME aggregations in 
European countries is presented. Finally, Section 5 draws conclusions and discusses 
future works.  
2. The model of the Italian network contract for SMEs 
The Italian business network contract stated in the Law 99 of July 23
rd
 2009 (Gazzetta 
Ufficiale  2009), allows two or more enterprises to jointly perform one or more 
economic activities falling within their social scopes in order to increase their mutual 
innovation capacity and competitiveness in the market. The law does not force the 
enterprises to be of the same nationality, thus international networks are allowed. 
The essential requirements of the network contract include (i) the statement of 
the strategic goal and common scopes to reach the improvement of innovative capacity 
and competitiveness for the network, (ii) the identification of a network program that 
contains the activities and investments needed for the implementation of the strategic 
goal together with the set of indicators useful to measure the network performances, and 
the rights and duties assumed by each participant, (iii) the establishment of a common 
fund managed by a management body composed by SME representatives, aimed at 
pursuing the strategic goal. The firms are also free to establish entry and exit rules, and 
closing conditions for the network. 
This bare description can be structured and enriched in an ontology (Bruno and 
Villa 2012), represented in the form of a UML class diagram (Fowler and Scott 2000). 
A class diagram is a static model that describes the structure of a system by showing the 
system classes, their attributes, and the relationships among them. In the class diagram, 
classes are represented with boxes which contain the name of the class and its attributes. 
The classes are connected by binary associations, which are represented as lines. The 
two ends of an association are labelled with the number of objects of the class that 
participate in the association, called multiplicity ( “1” for one instance, “1...N” for one 
or more instance). The UML class diagram of the Italian business network contract is 
reported in Figure 1. 
 Figure 1. UML class diagram of the Italian business network contract. 
 
The network contract is the central class which contains as attributes the details 
of the contract, i.e., the date in which the contract is signed, the period of life of the 
network, its name and the common scope of the SMEs that form the network. All 
classes representing the other fundamental concepts of the network contract are 
connected with it. The class named strategic goal contains the description of  the 
objectives of the network. The class of participants, which is a generalization of the 
entrepreneurs and enterprises classes, contains the participant name, the firm register 
and the administrative repertory (REA) number in which the participant is registered. 
The class of common found contains the total amount of investments done by SMEs in 
the network, while the class of fund contribution stores the contribution of each SME to 
the common fund (an initial amount and an annual amount). Each participant can elect 
one or more representatives, which constitute the Management Body (or Management 
Committee) of the network contract. The representatives are characterized by their 
name and the role they play in the management committee. The network program class 
contains the description of the program of the network to reach the objectives described 
in the strategic goal and each activity under the program is described in the 
corresponding class. The indicators to measure the network performances, and the other 
legal concepts, such as rights, duties, entry rules, exit rules, and resolutive condition are 
represented by the correspondent classes. 
The previously described UML diagram can be implemented in an ontology 
editor to allow the management of the model by computer software tools. An ontology 
formally represents knowledge as a set of concepts, properties and relationships within a 
domain, and has the aim of both allowing the clear separation of the domain knowledge 
(the model) from the operational knowledge (the instances) and enabling the reuse of 
the general model in different applications (Gaševic et al. 2006). Ontologies range from 
taxonomies and classifications to database schemas, and in recent years they have been 
adopted in many business and scientific communities as a way to share, reuse and 
process domain knowledge. We implemented the ontology with the Protégé software 
(http://protege.stanford.edu/). A screenshot of the ontology visualization is reported in 
Figure 2. The schema of the ontology is a direct representation of the UML diagram. 
The classes in the UML are concepts in the ontology with named relations between 
them having the cardinality restrictions and the names as defined in the UML.  
 Figure 2. Ontology of the Italian business network contract realized in Protégé. 
 
The presented model can be exploited by all the firms that want to build a 
network, to help them in the organization and the filling of the network contract. For 
each element the relationships with the other elements is formally defined. Each 
stipulated network contract can be represented as an instance of the ontology.  
However, the design of a SME network is not limited to filling the network 
contract model, but it is a process composed by more complex phases, which are 
described in the next section. 
3. SME network contract design  
The basic workflow for SME network design is reported in Figure 3. The 
starting point of a SME network design is the agreement of a number of SMEs on a new 
common service that can improve their productivity as well as the quality of their 
products. Once this objective is considered of common interest,  the participant SMEs 
that are to form the network perform a “network feasibility study”, with the scope of 
defining a preliminary network sketch to allow the evaluation of the design load as well 
as their respective involvement. The outputs of this phase are the base of the network, 
i.e., the strategic goal, the duration of the network, and the initial investments. Once 
these constraints are defined, participants can proceed with the “network contract 
negotiation”, which aims at balancing the global gain with individual SME financing 
possibilities. At the end of this phase, all the items described in the network ontology 
model in Figure 1 are defined, i.e., an instance of the network contract ontology is 
produced. Finally, for the defined time period, the participants remain connected in the 
designed network operation, under the control of the Management Committee, while the 
network performances are evaluated by means of the defined indicators. The two crucial 
phases of “network feasibility study” and “network contract negotiation” are detailed in 
the following. 
 
 
Figure 3. Phases of the SME network design.  
 
3.1 Network feasibility study 
As above outlined, the feasibility study of the SME network design has the 
scope of defining a preliminary sketch of the main characters of the network design, 
such to allow the potential network partners to evaluate the design load as well as their 
respective involvement (Ravazzi and Villa 2009).  
The network design problem here considered is the typical one to be approached 
by a set of SMEs aiming to build a common service: that means a given number N of 
SMEs will be involved in the future network, and that the SMEs are producing similar 
objects (thus, belonging to the same industrial sector). It is also considered that the 
development of the feasibility study as well as of the whole network design has to be 
managed by the above mentioned Management Committee, that receives the necessary 
contributions from the set of N SMEs which would be involved in the future network. A 
clear distinction between the “n-th SME contribution”, i.e. the contribution each SME 
gives to the common fund in order to compose the finance and resource reserve of the 
network design, and the “investment in the n-th SME” decided by the Management 
Committee, has to take into account. The former ones are the transfers of money and 
resources that each SME attributes to the Management Committee to create the “initial 
capital” of the network. The latter ones are the investments that the Management 
Committee will decide to use in order to improve the productivity of the whole network 
and the quality of each SME. 
The feasibility study needs to be supported by a specific formal model that could 
estimate the best network design gain in terms of the highest possible value increase of 
the network, depending on the investments the Management Committee would plan for 
each partner SME. Such a formal model is stated in terms of the following objectives 
and constraints, which formalize the reasoning for an assessment of the expected 
network design result. 
Strategic goal of the network design. The SME network is expected to reach a 
production target p* through an as effective as possible innovation of each n-th SME. 
Each n-th SME is also expected to reach a minimum quality target q* , which represent 
the quality of the network. To reach the production and quality targets, specific 
investments have to be applied in each SME. Said targets are expected to be assured for 
an a-priori decided “network life” H. 
Resources to be applied to the design development. The investment to be 
planned by the Management Committee for application in the n-th SME innovation, 
denoted by dKn,  is the sum of two types of investments: the investment for the process 
innovation (dKPn) and the investment for the product innovation in term of quality 
increase (dKQn): 
 dKn= dKPn + dKQn      (1) 
Network design variables. The variables involved in the network design are the 
process innovation (dpn) and the product innovation in terms of quality increase (dqn). 
They are again linearly dependent to the investment dKPn and dKQn respectively. 
 dpn = μn dKPn       (2) 
 dqn = βn dKQn       (3) 
where µn denotes the rate an investment gives rise to process innovation, and βn the rate 
an investment gives rise to a product quality improvement. 
Initial capital for the network design. The sum of contributions provided by the 
N SMEs, each one denoted by dKn°, is the initial capital of the Management Committee, 
which must be used to yield the best improvement of the SME network: 
        
 
        (4) 
where the right-hand-side term details the real budget of the network design, i.e., the 
common fund. 
Constraints on the network design results. The expected production level for the 
whole SME network (P) and the expected quality level to be reached by each SME (qn) 
are given by the following formula: 
 P =        p*,    pn = p0,n + dpn    (5) 
 qn = q0,n + dqn  ≥  q*      (6) 
Value increase of the network. Goal of the Management Committee is to obtain 
the highest possible increase of value I of the SME network, to obtain the maximum 
yield from the initial budget through the most effective innovations applied to all SMEs. 
So, each process innovation will generate a value increase for the n-th SME, as well as 
each product quality improvement (respectively measured by multiplying  the process 
and quality improvements by two constants, an and bn, that measure the improvements 
in financial terms). On the other hand, the common found will be the real global cost of 
the network design. 
 I =       
 
  ,   In = an dpn + bn dqn   (7) 
In formal terms, the set of conditions (1)-(3) and (5)-(6) could be recognized as a 
typical LP problem, where the network increase of value (7) has to be analyzed by 
taking into account the set of constraints above mentioned.  
However, a more deep analysis of the “network design problem” must be done, 
because – in practice – it refers to the problem of finding a “good” agreement among 
the N SMEs, taking into account the following: 
 - on one hand, each n-th SME contributes in the common found with proper 
financial amount and resources, according to its own investment possibility; 
- on the other, the Management Committee will decide investments in each SME 
such to obtain the maximum increase of value for the network and a good increase of 
quality for each SME production. 
This consideration suggests that a solution of the network design problem of 
really practical interest should be obtained by finding a good compromise between the 
desire of improvement of each SME and their respective contribution to the initial 
budget. The opens the following “negotiation step”. 
3.2 Network negotiation 
Finding a solution for the network design problem, i.e. values for dKPn and 
dKQn for each n,  means to decide which innovations should be applied to each n-th 
SME. One could say that this reflects into a “gain” for the n-th SME itself. Indeed, the 
design gives rise to a “gain” for the whole network, that can be quantified by the 
increase of productivity and the improvement of quality over the whole network life: 
                     =            (8) 
While G is the global final “result” of the network design, each term Gn denotes 
the technological “advantage” or gain to be attributed to the n-th SME. 
Taking into account the concept of  “design result”, the above stated problem 
can be approached as a “cooperative game”, in the form of a multi-person bargaining 
problem. As known, the game theory can be divided in two main approaches: the 
cooperative and the non-cooperative games (von Neumann and Morgenstern 1944). The 
actors in non-cooperative game theory are individual players who may reach 
agreements only if they are self-enforcing, while in cooperative game theory, the actors 
are coalitions, group of players. Cooperative game theory looks for the possible set of 
outcomes, study what the players can achieve, which coalitions will be formed, how the 
coalitions will distribute the outcomes and whether the outcomes are robust and stable 
(Sosic and Nagarajan 2006). It attempts to answer how the total value is divided up 
among the players and how this answer will depend on their bargaining power (Marchi 
et al. 2009). A player’s bargaining power depends on how much other players need him 
to form coalitions, that is his marginal contribution: in practice, the amount by which 
the created overall value will be reduced if this particular player leaves the game 
(Brandenburger 2007). There are several ways of solving a cooperative game: among 
them, the so called “core” and the “Shapley value”. The core is a solution concept that 
searches for the set of payoffs that no coalition can improve. The Shapley value 
prescribes a single payoff for each player, which is the average of all marginal 
contributions of that player to each coalition where the player is a member of (Serrano, 
2007).   
Considering  the technological advantage or gain (8) together with the 
constraints the set of conditions (1)-(3) and (5)-(6), and looking at the problem as a 
collaborative game, it could be solved by searching for a set of innovations for the 
individual SMEs (the “players”) such to obtain a “good” value for  the global gain (8). 
In case of maximization of the global gain, this reflects in pushing high innovations for 
the SMEs where the financial impact is high – according to (8) -  as well as their rates of 
investments – as in (2) and (3). This solution, indeed, implies some practical defaults. 
Among them, the main defect is to generate a greatly unbalanced network, with some 
SMEs, already well organized and with greater quality level, again supported, whilst 
some others, not so equipped and assessed, not able to receive a good investment. In 
practice, this means an unsuccessful design. On the other extreme, if a solution of the 
investment problem is searched by planning a no gain for the network design, then an 
attribution of investments to SMEs proportional to their respective initial contributions 
results. In this case, the problem is split into N independent sub-problems, and no real 
meaning of network design remains. 
These two considerations suggest that, in a practical situation, the above stated 
formal model should be used for clarifying the concept of network design, and any 
theoretically optimized investment must be followed by a “negotiation of contributions 
and investments”, such to balance global increase of innovation with individual SME 
financing possibilities. According to the “cooperative game” view and taking into 
account of its “core” (as above mentioned), each SME represented in the Network 
Committee will try to have the best possible balance between the finance contribution 
(delivered for the common project) and the innovation actions (planned for the 
application to the SME).  
4. Applying the SME network contract model to analyze SME aggregations 
in some European countries 
The SME network contract and negotiation models above developed can be used 
as analysis criterion for comparing the different types and models of SME aggregations 
in some European countries. A summary of the main aspects concerning the 
organization of SME networks in some EU countries can be found in (Villa and Taurino 
2011). 
France launched in 2004 an industrial policy to support initiatives emerging 
from academic and economic actors within a region to develop dynamic networks to 
link firms and research institutions, the so called Poles of Competiveness (Boucher and 
Dolgui 2009). The poles are associations of companies, private and public research 
centers, and teaching institutes, collectively involved in a public or private partnership 
with a common development strategy. They aim at launching new projects resulting in 
innovative technological and organizational advances, increased efficiency and job 
creation: national and regional governments both contribute to the funding of clusters 
(see http://www.competitivite.gouv.fr). Each pole is represented by a coordination 
entity with a specific legal structure, usually based on the status of an association, which 
employs a permanent staff to elaborate the general strategies of the cluster, manage the 
communication with the other clusters, and evaluate the projects. This structure as well 
as its main characters, its strength and weakness, can be recognized by using the 
ontology and negotiation models here proposed. First, the French approach to the 
network contract is to use a well-established form, the association, thus avoiding any 
uncertainty about the partners’ interactions; the same happens for the Management 
Committee, that is the association Board of Directors. Referring to the negotiation 
model of Section 3.2, in a pole of competitiveness there are N SMEs and an extraneous 
element (the government). If this last one will only transfer funding without 
participating in the management committee, then the network will result from a 
cooperative negotiation (or “game”). Otherwise, if the element “government” will 
participate in the committee, the negotiation degenerates since a member could 
influence all others without having operative tasks. In practice, as it generally happens, 
the government should contribute through plans, both with calls for projects (for new 
networks) and with an a-posteriori evaluation of the project results, without interfere in 
the committee activity. For instance, this is the typical way of doing of the European 
Commission, as in the recent Small Business Act for Europe (European Commission 
2008). 
In markets dominated by large multinational companies, the development of 
either virtual or outsourcing networks is frequent. Outsourcing networks typically link 
highly innovative de-verticalized leading firms with sets of highly functional suppliers 
who provided a wide range of production-related services (Heavey et al. 2009). These 
networks,  widespread in Ireland, are highly flexible systems characterized by short-
term contracts between participants to the network itself. In terms of the ontology 
model, the network contract structure is greatly simplified, because the enterprises 
aggregation is driven by the leading firm: the way the enterprises interact is typical of a 
supply chain. In presence of a leader, the problem of negotiation in terms of cooperative 
game disappears. The leader will try to optimize the global increase of value (7) of the 
network since the leader knows that its own parameters (see (2), (3) and (7)) will assure 
the maximum individual gain. However, the leader should take account that this 
optimization would give some gain also to weaker SMEs, in order to offer them some 
interest in the network constitution. 
In UK there is not a unique definition of SME clusters. For instance, the UK 
Department of Trade and Industry defines a cluster as a concentration of competing, 
collaborating and interdependent companies and institutions, which are connected by a 
system of market and non-market links (see http://www.dti.gov.uk), while the Scottish 
Enterprise defines clusters as a group of industries and organizations linked by a 
common goal or practice (http://www.scottish-enterprise.com). These differences show 
a significant variability in promoting and also evaluating the cluster aggregations in the 
various UK regions (Villa and Taurino 2011). In practice, both clusters composed by set 
of industries linked through vertical relations (client-supplier) and clusters composed by 
industries linked by horizontal relations (common customers, technologies and market 
channels) can be found. While the former ones essentially are supply chains, the 
negotiation model of the latter can be based on a cooperative negotiation of the network 
gain (8), as above outlined. 
The types of German clusters can be either created by government initiatives 
(top-down networks), or originated by some leading organization and supported by 
local political environments (top-down internally initiated networks), or created outside 
any public initiative (bottom-up networks). In practice, it can be found a mixture of 
these three scenarios, even if the first two are more frequent (Meier zu Köcker 2009). 
These two types of clusters – usually denoted “kompetenznetze” – are very similar to 
the French “poles de competitivité”: any consideration already done for the last ones 
can be referred to the German top-down networks. The last type (bottom-up networks) 
corresponds to the cooperative negotiation model: a cooperation-based aggregation with 
common strategic goal and network committee in order to manage the distribution of 
rates of the global gain to partners. 
 
Another form of aggregation of different types of bodies, both enterprises and 
research institutions, is the Science and Technology (S&T) Park. It is a sort of mediator 
to facilitate the creation of spin-off companies and disseminate innovative technological 
achievements to regional SMEs (Agoti et al. 2009). To encourage  the growth and the 
implementation of high-technology and innovation production, the S&T park provides 
services such as high-tech research installations, pilot laboratories, and incubators for 
new firms, and it facilitates the establishment of new companies and the innovation of 
products and services. Examples of important parks in Europe include the Cambridge 
Science Park in England, the Lindholmen Science Park in Sweden, the Sofia Antipolis 
Science Park in France, and the Patras Science Park in Greece.  In terms of the proposed 
ontology, the S&T park is a typical aggregation of independent bodies whose “contract 
network” states the rules to use some facilities provided by local/national governments, 
and the general scope of the park. In practice, they are not aggregations with scope: 
then, the negotiation model could provide at most some suggestions for creating internal 
“coalitions”. 
5. Some concluding remarks 
Looking at the European industrial system, if one takes account that SMEs are 
supplying labour to about 100 million citizens, this makes reason of the importance of 
SMEs, the real backbone of the European economy. However, the globalization of 
markets of goods and of labour makes individual SMEs no more competitive. During 
the last decade, the European Commission has perceived this critical situations and has 
stimulating research on what could be the antidote of the crisis: the development of 
profitable SME aggregations in terms of either poles of competitiveness, network of 
competence, clusters or industrial districts. The proposed ontology model of the 
network contract and the related negotiation model wants to be further tools to support 
this innovation crucial effort. They are directed to SME managers, to counteract their 
innate individualism, and to local governments, to offer them a tool to analyze some 
characters of the their industrial systems. The outlined application of the ontology and 
the negotiation models to different types of SME aggregations in some European 
countries can justify its usefulness, as well as an it will be done by their on-going 
application in a new collaboration between Politecnico di Torino and the National 
Federation of Craftsmen, just starting.  
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